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Abstract: We examine the political economy underpinnings of import protection in general
equilibrium. Starting from a dual theoretical representation of production, trade, and consump-
tion, we map a general representation of the real economy to underlying political processes aka
the political support function to derive a general representation of the determinants of import
protection. This includes the relatively standard approach of examining the pattern of taris in a
Grossman-Helpman framework, as well as recent extensions linked to upstream and downstream
linkages between sectors. Because we start from a relatively generic general equilibrium model
of production, we have an immediate bridge between the theory and general equilibrium-based
estimates of the welfare eects and rents generated by taris. We therefore follow the development
of our generalized theoretical framework by introducing the use of general equilibrium estimates
of the direct and indirect marginal impacts of protection at the sector level for econometric es-
timation of the revealed pattern of policy weights. This GE approach yields direct estimates of
political weights based on economic eects, including cross-industry eects. The resulting weights
lend insight into relative protection of agriculture and manufacturing. Working with data on the
European union, we nd that the strength of downstream linkages matters for policy weights and
rates of protection, as does the national posture of industry. We also nd support for a general
political support function in the determination of taris, though results are mixed for the more
narrow Grossman-Helpman specication. In the EU, nationality of industry seems to play a role
in the setting of Community-wide import protection.
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The current structure of trade protection in the EU has several determinants that can be traced
to historical factors, resource constraints, and political economy forces. Analyses of the latter,
however, have been relatively scarce due to the complexities inherent in a process that engages a
multitude of actors not only from Member countries, but also from the central institutions such
as the European Commission. The literature has instead focused attention on the determination
of trade policy in the US. In the context of the European Union, policies are in
uenced by both
national and regional factors in ways which are hard to detect. Explicit lobbying behaviour in the
Union, for instance, is particularly dicult to track. Unlike in the US, campaign contributions
in most EU countries are heavily restricted, if not forbidden, so that lobbying comes in much
less overt forms. This is crucial because in standard endogenous protection models, the amount
of lobbying directly translates into weights attached by government to industry interests. As
government choice hinges essentially on the issue of trade-o between competing societal and
private interests, these weights determine where the policy chips will fall.
Even when data on campaign contributions are available, recent empirical work on US
trade protection illustrates the various problems involved in capturing the extent of lobbying
activities. In a survey of empirical approaches on endogenous protection, Gawande and Krishna
(2001) discuss the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) tests
of the Grossman-Helpman model, where data on political contributions of corporate institutions
are used as lobbying indicators. Problems pointed out by Krishna and Gawande include the
diculties inherent in isolating that part of the total nancial support particularly aimed at
in
uencing trade policy, and the exclusion of non-corporate sources of electoral nancial support,
such as labor unions. This may have resulted in misspecications and underestimation of the
political strength of private interests, and thus may account for some curious results found in the
literature. One such result is the extremely high estimate of the weights government attaches to
overall welfare relative to industry rents, spanning from 100 to 3000, and the other is the very low
value of total political contributions (in the range of $30 million) relative to the large deadweight
loss and producer surplus stemming from protection.
Given the prominent role assigned to lobbying, attempts must nonetheless be made to
indirectly craft acceptable lobby indicators if the Grossman-Helpman test is to be extended to more
countries. Several approaches emerge. One is to simply assume that industries fullling a certain
set of criteria are more likely to be politically organized than others. In Gawande, Sanguinetti
and Bohara (2001) work on Mercosur, for instance, they take industries whose imports surpass
1the sample mean as actively lobbying for protection. Another method is to equate membership in
any industry-related organization with lobbying, as in Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2004)
in their study of Turkey. Cadot, Grether and de Melo (2003) instead illustrate an approach where
the classication of industries as being politically active or passive is endogenized in a multi-stage
iterative procedure. In a more recent paper, Cadot, Dutoit, Grether, and Olarreaga (2007) identify
politically organized rms using trade and production data. They apply a 3-stage process where a
standard Grossman-Helpman model was estimated, producing the usual results (i.e., endogenous
taris as a function of import penetration rates, among others). They then use the residuals
of the regression to rank industries, with high residuals implying greater political organization.
An arbitrary cut-o value is determined, above which industries are considered to be organized.
Finally, they run a grid search over dierent cuto values. One problem raised by Eshafani
and Leaphart (2001) refers to the manner in which the coecient of the output-import ratio
is specied as function of political organization alone, thereby giving the lobby indicator all the
chances to prove signicant. It becomes even trickier in cases where certain industry characteristics
such as industrial concentration and import penetration are used as proxies for lobbying activity,
given the many alternative channels by which these variables may aect the policy preferences of
government. Also, the dilemma posed by the high weights attached to overall welfare remains,
because even taking the lowest estimates derived by Cadot, et al (2007)1, the weights are such as
to make any lobbying prohibitive. The question then lingers, what drives protection?
We re-examine this problem in this paper, and follow an alternative route to our goal
of assessing the relative importance of industry against overall interests in the determination of
trade policy in the EU. We adopt the Hillman (1989) and Grossman-Helpman (1994) notion of a
government trading-o the industry rents stemming from protection against the losses accruing
to the general population, and attempt to approximate this ordering of preferences by looking
at the economic impact of actual government action as revealed by the structure of protection.
Specically, we back out the weights implied by the marginal welfare eects of the set of import
policies in the EU, building on the partial equilibrium approaches of Gardner (1987), Tyers (1990)
and Anderson (1980), as well as the general equilibrium approach of Tyers (2004)2. Employ-
ing a numerical general equilibrium model of the EU, we estimate the direct marginal eect of
sector-level protection on protected industries, the indirect eect on upstream and downstream
industries, and the eect on overall welfare. With these marginal eects as a starting point, we
1They nd, for instance, that the weight given by government to social welfare relative to contributions is 3.1.
This implies that each lobby should contribute $3 for each dollar of deadweight loss.
2In general, the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium computational literature has used numerical models
to calibrate policy weights for use in numerical modelling. In contrast, here we use a numerical model to estimate
raw marginal policy impacts, but then turn to econometrics for analysis.
2then econometrically calculate the apparent weights of industry in policymaking given the cur-
rent tari structure. We also aim for a more detailed view of the EU political market by further
deconstructing these weights along the lines of industry nationality and other related sector char-
acteristics. Unraveling national preferences is particularly important in the EU context, because
while the supply of regional protection obviously corresponds to the sum of individual national
demands, the common trade policy in the EU and the complexities surrounding it conceal the
interplay of private, national and aggregate regional interests.
This approach has a number of clear advantages. First of all, the eects of protection on
overall welfare are fully captured, and are not solely limited to tari revenue eects as implied by
import demand elasticities. Hence, the valuation of the marginal costs and benets of protection
more adequately takes into account the economy-wide repercussions of sectoral policies. The
policy weights are also backed by data. Consequently, unlike previous empirical studies, the
values we obtain for these weights tie in with theoretical expectations: revealed policy weights
given to industry prots, in general, tend to be around 2 to 3 times that assigned to national
income or welfare. We also nd that the high protection received by an industry is not necessarily
always explained by greater political value attached to that sector. Indeed, our results show that
the policy weights of less protected sectors are comparable to those that enjoy high protection.
Once again, these outcomes may have been the product of a better coverage of aggregate welfare
eects, so that taris are not only explained by sectoral prot gains but by the societal costs
of protection as well. In the context of a customs union such as the EU, we also nd that
nationality matters, so that industries important to certain Member States in terms of relative
output shares, consistently acquire higher levels of protection. Finally, the agricultural bias of EU
protection emerges as a by product, in part, of a tendency to assign importance to the strength
of intermediate linkages, with upstream industries receiving relatively lower taris weights for a
given policy weight. We have organized the paper as follows. Section 2 provides background. In
Section 3 we examine basic patterns of EU import protection, using a relatively standard political
economy framework for testing the relationships between sectoral tari variations and selected
industry characteristics identied as important by theory. In Section 4, we then examine what
drives the observed patterns by employing a computational model to produce estimates of the
general equilibrium marginal income eects given the actual rates and pattern of protection and
production across the EU. From these marginal estimates, we estimate econometrically the implied
weights for individual sectors relative to the weight assigned to overall economic welfare. This
allows a ranking of industries according to the assigned relative weights. In Section 5 we explore
how national and EU-wide industry characteristics, especially the nationality of various industries,
3bears on the determination of the EU-wide industry coecients. This provides some indication of
the individual policy preferences of Member States. In Section 6 we oer some nal observations,
and then conclude.
2 Background
The evolution of European taris, reveals not only trends in trade protection, but also gives some
indication of the liberal and protectionist forces at play across the continent. The 1968 common
external taris (CET) of 10.4% is the arithmetical average of the Italian and French high taris
(16.8% and 15.3%, respectively), and the lower ones of Germany and the Benelux countries (5.8%
and 8.7%). The same dierentiation can be seen in the old EFTA as well, with the UK and Austria
being relatively more protectionist (14.9%, 11.4%), compared to their Scandinavian counterparts
(Sweden, 6.3%; Denmark, 5.2%).
After four and one-half decades, tari protection in industrial goods has markedly de-
clined in importance, with the simple average CET posting at a historically low 4.1% in 2001.
However, aside from tari peaks in chemicals, footwear, transport vehicles, more opaque protec-
tionist instruments have been introduced, so that when these non-tari barriers are accounted for,
the rate of overall protection almost doubles to 7.7% (Messerlin, 2001).
Agricultural protection is typically a dierent story, and in the European case, it even
merits a distinct Community-wide sectoral policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (a.k.a. the
CAP). Free internal agricultural trade has been accompanied by a substantial increase in external
protection that for years has proven to be resistant to any reform. Liberalization did make some
headway in the 1990s , but Messerlin still reports a high overall protection rate of 31.73%.
Table 1 in the Appendix presents data on EU applied import protection, import shares,
and output shares for 2001.4 Processed sugar and dairy products, which were excluded from the
1992 CAP Reform, register some of the highest rates of protection, at 110%, and 38% respectively.
Processed rice production is likewise heavily protected (108%), as is beef (46%). Tari peaks in the
manufacturing sector are fewer in number (and except for trucks, mostly agro-related: processed
foods, beverages and tobacco) and at much lower rates.
In terms of output shares, services dominate the EU, with 62 percent of output by value.
In manufacturing, the four largest sectors in the EU, in terms of the sectoring scheme of our data,
are chemicals, other machinery, motor vehicles, and electrical equipment. They account for almost
50% of manufacturing output value and 16% of all output. In each of these sectors, Germany is the
3See Pelkmans (2001), chapter 11, pp. 219 -222.
4The source of these data is discussed below, in Section 3.
4largest producer. However, Germany is likewise a major producer of some important agricultural
sectors: it supplies 22% of total production of milk and dairy products, 44% of oil seed oils, 25% of
other grains and 23% of the most politically sensitive product, sugar. Italys interest is particularly
concentrated in textiles (supplying 24% of output), apparel (35%) and leather (includes footwear,
43%). However, compared to other EU Members, these industries account for a greater share in
Portugals total output. In other tari peak products such as rice, Italy (supplying 54%) and Spain
(31%) greatly benet, while in meat, the four big members: France (18%), UK (16%), Germany
(16%), and Italy (12%), receive the most producer surplus from protection.
Early empirical tests on the European pattern of protection have shown that despite the
dierences in the market and production structures across members, the level of Community taris
did not signicantly change the relative protection between dierent sectors. Constantopoulos
(1974) noted that while European countries have followed dierent tari regimes, the national
structure of protection in the 6 original EEC countries did not actually dier very much. Her
results also show that extra-EEC protection displayed positive correlation with the relative share
of unskilled labor and the level of R&D content. This implies that regardless of dierences in
specialization, the same Stolper-Samuelson eects seemed to be at play in the determination of
trade regimes, and that some congruence of industrial policy goals existed among the original
Members.
More recent analytical and empirical work also underscores the role of political economy
determinants. Examples of properties that map well with political in
uence, and hence, with
protection trends, are those that facilitate collective action among producers. A high concentration
of ownership, for instance, implies few players and thus less likelihood of free-riding. Greater
industry size, on the other hand, raises the stakes involved in cooperation among producers to
secure protection.
There are models of endogenous protection that instead stress the supply incentives,
such as the electoral need of governments to win as many votes as possible. In this instance,
total employment (i.e. voting strength) of the sector is key. Still others draw attention to the
(conservative) politicians aversion to changing the prevailing level and distribution of income,
so that taris are used to compensate for the income shifts brought about by unemployment or
surges in import penetration. Thus, it is the changes, not the composition or the absolute levels
of employment and imports, which explain the supply of protection. However, evidence on the
extent and direction of tari eects associated with some industry characteristics is ambiguous.
Consider for example the case of the role of industry size. Larger industries are said to be
politically important because of the votes they deliver. Hence, one can expect to nd higher
5rates of protection in larger industries. (Finger, Hall & Nelson, 1982; Lee & Swagel, 1997). On
the other hand, these sectors face more collective action problems, so that taris are likely to be
lower (Tre
er, 1993). Cadot, de Melo & Olarreaga (1999) also predict protection to drop in these
industries as a result of general equilibrium adjustment in the labour market.5 In the Grossman-
Helpman model (1994), industry size is not at all important if sector lobbying is zero. There is
also an endogeneity problem, as industries that receive protection will then expand.
In recent empirical work on the EU, Tavares (2004), found support for the hypothesis
that the movement towards deeper integration, ushered in by the 1987 Single Market programme,
did lead to a more centralized tari-setting process. Technically, this means that the specication
wherein national size or in
uence do not play a role (i.e. industry characteristics are merely
summed up or averaged to form the EU characteristics used for estimation), would seem to explain
the structure of protection better than those where the preference of the decisive country voter
is what counts. In an earlier work however, Tavares (2001) reported opposite results. He then
reported that policymaking re
ects bargaining between members who are themselves in
uenced
by national lobbies. In fact, the best specication the author nds in that paper is one where the
exogenous variables are weighted according to the share of votes accorded to each country in the
Council of Ministers. This implies, for instance, that the preferences of larger countries, having
more votes, are given more weight in decision-making.
3 Taris and Industry Characteristics
As a preliminary step, we now revisit the basic approach of the existing literature with regard
to tari patterns. We focus on relationships between protection and some of the political deter-
minants earlier mentioned, testing for the importance of nationality on the sectoral variation in
taris. In particular, we examine the role of industry size both EU-wide and with respect to the
12 individual national economies making up the EC12.6 In both the adding-machine and in the
Grossman-Helpman models, size is expected to enhance the political value of industry rents to
national leaders, who collectively exercise tari-setting powers in the Council of Ministers.7 In
theory, large industries are hindered only by free-riding in launching an eective lobby. In prac-
tice, as long as the stakes are high enough, even with many rms, the collective action problem
5Wages, and production costs rise because of the output increase initially triggered by taris, so that eventually
the demand for protection falls.
6Namely: Belgium (Bel), Denmark (Den), Finland (Fin), France (Fra), Germany (Ger), Great Britain (GBR),
Greece (Gre), Ireland (Ire), Italy (Ita), Luxembourg (Lux), Netherlands (Ned), Portugal (Por), Spain (Spa), and
Sweden (Swe). As Austria, Sweden, and Finland were outsiders when current rates were set, we leave them out of
the present assessment.
7Industry size also impacts on the government objective function through its eect on aggregate welfare, so that
protection imposed on larger industries also leads to larger deadweight losses.
6is solved through industry associations, cooperation across lobbies, and leadership by the very
large rms, so that rent-seeking activities extend to in
uence the regional agenda-setting body
(European Commission) as well. Tavares quotes Lehmanns (2003) report that in 2000, about
2,600 interest groups were active in Brussels, composed of European trade federations (30%),
commercial consultants (20%), European companies (10%), national business (10%), Euro-
pean NGOs (10%), labor organizations (10%), regional representations (5%), international
organizations (5%), and think tanks (1%).
We also include a variable for strength of downstream linkages, INT SHARE. This variable
measures the share of output that goes to intermediate rather than nal demand, and is based
on the intermediate use matrix included in our social accounting data. As pointed out by Cadot,
de Melo and Olarreaga (2004), input-output linkages introduce inter-sectoral rivalries, and it thus
becomes a point of interest how government weighs the welfare of upstream against downstream
industries.
3.1 Tari and protection data sources
For our estimates, we work with a set of integrated social accounting data that combine import
protection with input-output structures, intermediate and nal demand, bilateral trade 
ows,
and tari protection. These are the global social accounting data organized by the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP), a research consortium that includes international organizations like the
World Bank, OECD, European Commission, and several UN and national agencies. We use the
GTAP version 5 and version 6 databases, which are for 1997 and 2001 respectively. (See Dimaranan
and McDougall, 2002). Within this database, European industrial production and employment

ows are based on sets of Member State social accounting data originating, ultimately, with
Eurostat. These are supplemented by data on bilateral import protection, including adjustments
for non-reciprocal preferential import protection and bilateral free trade agreements. In the case
of agriculture, the data also include ad valorem equivalents of specic taris. The 2001 protection
data are based on Bouet et al (2004). The 1997 protection data are from the World Bank and
UNCTAD. In the case of both the 1997 and 2001 data, taris are drawn from the WTOs integrated
database of taris and bindings, and well as the UNCTAD TRAINS dataset and national schedules.
A great advantage of these data is that we have a consistent mapping of economic 
ow
data (intermediate demands, nal goods production, imports, exports, and nal demand) to cor-
responding trade policy data. In the case of the EU, our focus here, the pattern of protection
vis--vis external trading partners will, overall, re
ect the politics that has driven the EU to leave
7out sensitive sectors in bilateral negotiations on free trade areas, and also the sensitivity of these
same sectors as re
ected in MFN tari schedules.
3.2 Results
We rely on the data as outlined above for the 12 European Union Members in 2001. As a measure
of protection we use extra-EU trade weighted tari rates that re
ect the pattern of preferential
trade arrangements, WTO concessions, and the exclusion of sectors from these arrangements.
Industry size is measured by shares in total EU output value, and denoted as EU SHARE. To
gauge for the intensity of unskilled labour use, we include it here as UNSKL, using the shares of
unskilled wages in total wages by sector as a proxy. To capture the nationality of each industry, we
once again use industry size, but now national sector output shares S. Where relevant (i.e. when
not using dummies) variables are in logs. We assign a dummy to agricultural products, FOOD,
given the special historical and political circumstances surrounding its protection that cannot be
captured in our estimation.
Variations in sector taris are tested against the above-mentioned industry characteristics
in a straightforward fashion:





Our dataset contains observations for 12 EU countries, and for 41 agricultural, manufacturing and
extraction sectors, and taken for 2001. Robust regression results are reported in Table 1. The
results at this stage can be summarized as follows:
 Large sectors have lower rates of protection.
 Controlling for size and nationality of industry, food sectors are not disproportionately pro-
tected.
 Unskilled labor-intensive sectors do not receive higher protection rates. Indeed the opposite
seems to hold.
 The intensity of downstream linkages matters for protection levels.
 Nationality does matter.
Our results support the notion that larger sectors are harder to organize in Europe. All other
things equal, the sectoral demand for protection is less likely to be accommodated, the larger is
8the size of its output. Intermediate linkages imply that more deeply integrated sectors receive less
protection than do nal goods sectors. Contrary to previous results in the literature, however,
sectors where unskilled earnings are important do not appear to invite higher taris. What is
clear from the table is that the nationality of industries is highly correlated with the extent of
protection received. For instance, sectors where Germany, Britain, and especially, France, have
higher output shares relative to the EU average, also get relatively higher protection, holding
importance across other Members constant.
The results in Table 1 represent the standard approach, prior to the recent empirical
literature that has emerged following Grossman and Helpman (1994). In a Grossman-Helpman









 is positive for protected industries and identical across protected industries, and the tari
is higher the greater output X and the 
atter the import demand curve, represented here by the
slope M. Table 2 presents estimates of equation (2) in logs. Even at our level of aggregation,
we have sectors with zero protection. Therefore, we report both equation (2) estimated using
OLS, and using a Heckman selection framework to allow for the fact that industries must receive
protection rst before the level is then determined, in the Grossman-Helpman framework. In
the table, the variable SIGMA is the elasticity of import demand (represented by Armington
elasticities, as taken from our CGE model data). Broadly speaking, the results are consistent with
the mixed results in the literature. As predicted by almost all endogenous protection models, the
elasticity of demand has a positive sign. Industry size has a negative sign, which may be more
consistent with Olson-type models of organization challenge than the Grossman-Helpman model.
We also nd that intermediate linkages matter in this setup. This is consistent with the results
reached by Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (2004).
4 Estimating industry weights
We now take a step away from current practice, focusing on explaining observed patterns by
explicitly estimating the objective function of the reduced-form regional policymaker, say for
simplicity, an EU  Uber-Commissioner. Our goal is to express the level of EU-wide protection as
the outcome of the Commissions maximization problem with respect to this objective function.
This has the advantage of capturing the general equilibrium eects of protection, where for example
9steel protection may hurt motor vehicles, thereby providing more insight into the interaction of
policy choice and the cost and benets that this choice implies.
We proceed by employing a stylized Grossman-Helpman political in
uence model, speci-
fying the objective function for the Commission as follows:





where a and b correspond to the weights attached by the  Uber-Commissioner to Community
(W) and industry welfare (Wi), respectively. Assuming that taris (and potentially other policy
instruments) are set to maximize this function, the equilibrium tari rates will map to the following






























Our data for the left- and right-hand sides of equation (5) come from the marginal shocks to
taris in our model of the EU economy for 1997 and 2001. We derive this by applying small (1%)
changes in EU external taris sector by sector within a general equilibrium model incorporating
the data outlined above, and using the model to then estimate the direct and indirect impact
of each tari on overall economic welfare (measured as equivalent variation) and also on capital
income within each sector.
The basic modeling framework, as implemented, is quite complex, and we refer the reader
to Hertel et al (1997) for the blow-by-blow on algebraic structure.9 For our purposes, the key
features of the numerical model can be summarized as follows. First, we dene composite or
aggregate goods in each region r that are either purchased as intermediates or consumed as nal
goods. The set of prices for these composite or aggregate goods within a region P
r
A will be
a function of the set of prices for domestic goods within a region Pr








8Note that while we are working with taris, one could add other industrial and tax policies to the mix. In
theory, for each policy in isolation, the corresponding version of equations (3) and (4) should hold.
9The actual model les used to estimate the marginal eects are available for download.
10Equation (6) involves a CES composite of domestic and imported goods. The internal price for





The domestic price will depend on the price of primary inputs indexed over factors v, Pr
v, as well
as the price of composite goods used as intermediates, Pr






The cost function in equation (8) follows from CES technologies for value-added, combined with a
Leontief-nest between intermediate goods and value added. Given domestic prices for inputs and
outputs, the demand for primary inputs v will be a function of unit input coecients (determined
by relative input prices) and by total demand for domestic output Q.
vr = (Qr) 0 (cr
v (Pr
v)) (9)
The input coecients c follow from the CES production technology for value added. Demand for
goods will be a function of the entire set of global incomes I and prices P,
Q = fq (P;I) (10)
where incomes are an outcome of the full general equilibrium solution across nal and intermediate
demands within the model. Incomes in each region are the sum of factor incomes and taxes
collected 	. Tax collections are a function of tax rates  .
Ir = (Pr
v)
0 (vr) +  (P
m;Pr
v; ) (11)
Finally, welfare u is then dened in terms of an aggregate consumer with standard preferences,
such that we can write an expenditure function e (e(:) dened over consumer prices and welfare.
e(ur;Pr
A) = Ir (12)
We apply the model with a two-region version of the dataset, the two regions being the EU and
the rest of the world. Conceptually therefore, if we take one of the regions r as the European
11Union, and we dierentiate the entire system with respect to a given EU tari, we will arrive at
a marginal impact of this tari on reduced form national income (equation 11) and also factor
incomes (equation 9). Operationally, we apply 1% changes in the power of the tari T = 1 + 
to estimate such marginal changes. In the context of the model, this yields changes to capital
income to each sector (where we treat capital as xed to a sector) as well as changes in overall
national income I. This in turn lets us calculate the corresponding marginal impact in social
welfare, measured by equivalent variation. Our sectors are those in Table 1. Equipped with an
assessment of welfare eects, we are then able to evaluate econometrically the relative weights,
bi/a, given the actual pattern of tari protection in the EU.
The estimated relative industry weights for our 33 commodities are reported in Table 3.
The full estimating equation also includes indirect service sector eects (not shown).10 Several
points are striking from the results. First, unlike the recent literature based on U.S. political
contributions data, we do not get unbelievably high national income/welfare weights. Indeed, in
general, industry weights tend to be around 2 to 3 times the corresponding weight on national
income/welfare. In other words, special interests receive a higher weight than Community welfare
does.
Another striking point is that while manufacturing sectors all receive considerably less
protection compared to agriculture, their policy weights are actually comparable. This implies
that there is not much correlation between taris and weights, a rather counter intuitive result
underscored by Figure 1. In the Figure, we map estimated weights against 2001 tari rates. As
noted earlier, agricultural protection in Europe has deep political and historical roots, and results
here seem to suggest that taris are now currently high in agriculture, not strictly because of the
political power of farmer groups, but because of the low economy-wide eects that agricultural
protection implies. To anticipate the econometric results reported below, giving in to the demands
of the food industry carries relatively little negative implications for other industries compared, for
example, to steel.11 However, in manufacturing, taris and weights move in a more congruent way.
The higher weights attached to iron and steel, apparel, textiles, and leather are re
ected in the
higher protection they receive relative to other non-farm products. Still, taris are considerably
lower in manufacturing to begin with, and hence, so are their contributions to overall equilibrium
distortion patterns.
The bottom of the table also reports test statistics for Chi-squared tests on linear re-
10Out of curiosity, we also experimented with including a measure of rest-of-world welfare eects. The rest of
world receives no signicant weighting, based on those regression results.
11Put another way, heavy protection for steel would have heavy ramications for construction, motor vehicles,
and the machinery sector, whereas protection of rice only hurts consumers, and not so much competing industries.
12strictions across parameters. In particular, if the EU is working like a strict Grossman-Helpman
world, with agents playing locally truthful strategies, then the estimated political weights, when
signicant and with the correct sign, should be zero. We reject this restriction quite strongly.
5 Deconstructing the Industry Weights
We now proceed by once again inspecting the in
uence of individual members, this time on the
determination of the implicit policy weights assigned by the EU on various industries from Table
3. This is done by regressing the estimated relative industry weights, bi/a, against the same
political determinants employed in section 2, and the industry size indicator per EU-12 country.
In addition, we also estimate taris as a function of revealed policy weights from Table 3, and
as a function of the importance of intermediate linkages  INT SHARE   and whether or not
the sector is a food sector  FOOD. In formal terms, we estimate equations (13) and (14) as a
system of two equations using iterated SUR least squares:





ln(1 + t)i = 1WEIGHTi + 2INT SHAREi + 3FOODi + ei (14)
Regression results are reported in Table 4. The results further underscore the ndings of low
weights being attached to agricultural products, and greater value assigned to larger sectors. This
time, however, the negative correlation between unskilled-labour intensity and the policy in
uence
of an industry registers as statistically insignicant. Basically, in terms of policy weights, skill
intensity does not appear to matter. Neither does sector size. What does matter is nationality,
agricultural orientation, and also the strength of intermediate linkages. In particular, sectors that
are important for downstream production receive lower policy weights.
Turning next to tari rates themselves, we get as good a t using the industry weights,
INT SHARE, and FOOD as we did with the full specication in Table 4. In other words,
the weights do a good job catching the impact of variations in national in
uence within the
EU when the overall rate of protection is set. In addition, as we would expect if our  Uber-
Commissioner cared about direct and indirect eects, we nd that the intensity of intermediate
linkages matters, and with the expected sign. The INT SHARE term also provides insight into
agricultural protection. Processed foods are not inputs to industry. They are consumed directly.
As such, they are easier to protect, in a political sense, than sectors like steel and chemicals.
13One nal appeal of this exercise is an examination of how the stance of protection in 1958
maps to the in
uence on EU taris in 2001. In Figure 2, we have plotted actual and predicted
weights against 1958 tari rates prior to the CET for the EC12 countries in Figure 1. It is clear
that the countries with the highest revealed policy weights in 2001 (France, Britain, Italy) are the
ones that had the highest taris in 1958, while the general pattern is one of more protectionist
Members continuing to in
uence the policy process in Brussels. 12
Finally, we revisit the Grossman-Helpman specication in equation (2) and Table 2, now
reported in Table 5. We now drop the intercept (theoretically equal to the identical industry
weights) and again apply a selection model, where taris are now modeled as being a direct
function of our estimated weights. Based on the Chi-squared and F statistics, the specication
in Table 5 does a much better job than the specication in Table 2. Taris vary positively with
estimated industry weights, and negatively with the importance of downstream linkages. However,
we have already rejected the restriction that the coecients/weights are identical across industries,
while the size and demand elasticity coecients again have the wrong sign. Like the results in
Table 5, we nd support for a political weighting scheme driving protection, but not one following
strict Grossman-Helpman type restrictions on the disposition of lobbying rents.
6 Conclusions
The applied literature on political economy determinants of import protection is largely focused
on the US. Yet the EU oers a contrasting model. Both are customs unions, though they dier in
age. They also dier in that national governments play a more direct role in the EU than do state
governments in the US. There are numerous diculties one can expect in directly observing the
political economy underpinnings of trade policy in such a Union, where overt lobbying and political
contributions can be illegal, and where the policy mechanisms themselves have evolved in both
ambition and complexity. We work around this problem by using an alternative approach { general
equilibrium estimates of the impact of EU trade policy { to directly estimate the relative political
weights assigned to industry. From this starting point, we have explored basic correlations found
and discussed in the literature. Results show that industry size may cause coordination problems,
leading to less protection. The country origin of industry also matters. Looking at the revealed
policy preferences of the individual EU-12 countries, it is possible to make a distinction between
high- and low- tari countries. What is interesting is that this mirrors more or less the early
12For Figure 2, the R2 = :678 and F;Pr > F: 12.673,0.01. The tari coecient is 14.72 (t=3.56).
14classication of countries even before the CET was established in 1968. 13 This suggests that
trade policy preferences of countries relative to each other, have remained fairly constant through
almost ve decades of European integration.
To further understand how sectoral interests are valued by policymakers, we have esti-
mated the marginal eects of protection on overall and industry incomes as they are specied in
the objective maximization problem of an in
uence-driven government model. Using a general
equilibrium framework to explicitly derive these estimates, we are then able to extract the appar-
ent weights of various industries in the policy process. This also allows us to further deconstruct
these weights along the lines of industry nationality, and other related characteristics.
Results show several factors re
ected in the estimated political weights. First is the role
of output size. Standard political economy models, working under the assumption of constant-
returns-to-scale, consider the marginal impact of protection on factor incomes to be neutral to size.
Hence, the importance attached to industry size is conditional on the amount of lobbying in the
sector, as in Grossman & Helpman, or conditional on the amount of nominal votes it can deliver.
Our estimates show that the specication where output plays a focal role provides a very good t,
suggesting the role of size supports the notion in the literature of coordination problems. Second,
the depth of intermediate linkages matters. In particular, in the complex dance of interests that
denes the pattern of taris, and the resulting political weights, the likelihood of protection if lower
(and net in
uence is weaker) if special consideration leads to negative consequences downstream.
A third point is that national priorities and industry characteristics matter not only for
taris, but also for the assignment of policy weights. Explaining why the experiments done here
consistently point to both the French and British as the most prominent players in EU trade
policymaking (at least on the import protection side) is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
the French result conrms popular beliefs. The British (and Italian) results are fully consistent
with the original tari stance in 1958, before the birth of the common external tari. Indeed,
the history of European integration is replete with political ordeals related to eorts to cope with
British, French and Italian insistence on special treatment (the British rebate) and resistance
to liberalisation (France at the end of the Uruguay Round and during the Doha Round). The
most infamous example is perhaps the adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy, commonly
regarded as a condition tied by the French government in 1964 to the second round of liberalization
in intra-EC manufacturing trade.
Finally, it is worth noting that tari protection, at least in manufacturing, has indeed
13An exception is Germany, which appears to have increased its preference for protection. However, the statistical
signicance of the German coecient is rather low in our estimates, thereby making it dicult to pose any denitive
judgement.
15become less important for the EU as compared to the past. Only non-Europe OECD and non-
WTO countries now face the MFN and tari peak rates, and even in agriculture, further reforms
are being introduced (i.e. in sugar). Still, what our results illustrate is that the political economy
bedrock of policy making is more complex than a more simple analysis would suggest. Moreover,
due to the general equilibrium approach taken here, trade policy can be used to deduce the political
weights that could be re
ected in other policies as well. Hence, while direct evidence on national
and regional preferences might not be in place, this exercise does convey some indications of the
general industry weights behind a wider range of policies.
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Taris ln(1 + t) regressed on structural and regional variables
RHS variables coecient t   ratio
Sigma -0.001 -(0.82)
Size -20.110 -(2.79) ***
FOOD -0.001 -(0.28)
UNSKL -0.027 -(1.59)
INT SHARE -0.693 -(6.07)
BEL 0.941 (0.15)
DNK 0.272 (0.39)
FRA 4.931 (2.50) **
DEU 4.589 (2.37) **




LUX 1.201 (5.23) **
NLD 1.135 (1.51)
PRT 1.923 (3.39) **
ESP 1.664 (1.90) *
Estimates are based on robust regressions
OLS R-sq: 0.48, obs: 42
F(16;25) : 7:96;Pr > F : 0:00
*:signicant at the .01 level, **: .05 level, ***: .01 level.
Table 2
Taris ln(1 + t)regressed on Grossman-Helpman variables
single equation Heckman Heckman
RHS variables OLS ML Probit
Sigma 1.331 1.331
(1.41) (2.12) **
Size -0.344 -0.325 0.492
-(1.80) * -(1.53) (2.13) **
INT SHARE -2.457 -2.495 -2.299





OLS R2 : obs : 34 0.42
F(3;31);Pr > F : 0:00 12.25, 0.00
Obs, censored obs 42,7
Wald 2(3), Pr > 2 24.57,0
OLS Estimates are based on robust regressions, t-ratios in parentheses
*:signicant at the .01 level, **: .05 level, ***: .01 level.
19Table 3





a rate of import
industry weight t   ratio protection, %
rice -3.07 -(2.62) *** 53.5
wheat -2.06 -(6.22) *** 0.9
grains -2.07 -(5.78) *** 17.9
horticulture -1.85 -(8.31) *** 16.6
oilseeds -2.04 -(5.87) *** 0.0
cane & beet sugar -1.17 -(1.36) * 9.1
plant bres -2.21 -(1.58) * 0.0
other crops -1.58 -(7.37) *** 2.5
cattle -1.94 -(6.39) *** 11.6
other livestock -1.28 -(4.59) *** 1.3
dairy products -1.46 -(6.07) *** 0.0
animal bres -1.79 -(0.78) 0.0
forestry -0.13 -(1.03) 0.1
sh -0.64 -(4.02) *** 2.6
coal -0.08 -(0.24) 0.0
oil -0.28 -(0.16) 0.0
gas -1.59 -(1.61) * 0.0
other minerals 0.43 -(1.90) ** 0.0
beef products -3.50 -(7.14) *** 46.3
other meat products -2.74 -(5.82) *** 18.8
vegetable oils -0.95 -(5.96) *** 11.9
milk products -2.25 -(6.64) *** 38.1
processed rice -2.91 -(2.01) ** 108.4
processed sugar -1.95 -(5.19) *** 110.1
other foods -2.33 -(7.90) *** 8.2
beverages & tobacco -0.63 -(3.53) *** 7.4
textiles -4.21 -(6.08) *** 3.8
apparel -3.02 -(7.07) *** 4.7
leather -4.48 -(8.10) *** 5.0
lumber -1.25 -(3.15) *** 0.4
paper, pulp, plastics -1.15 -(2.35) *** 0.2
petrochemicals -0.91 -(1.35) * 1.1
chemicals, rubber, plastics -1.03 -(3.69) *** 1.7
non-metallic minerals -0.56 -(2.34) *** 2.1
iron, steel -3.27 -(4.72) *** 4.7
nonferrous metals -2.77 -(5.45) *** 0.8
fabricated metals -1.36 -(4.26) *** 1.3
motor vehicles -1.64 -(2.39) *** 4.0
other transport -1.96 -(6.81) *** 1.4
electric machinery -0.62 -(1.27) 0.8
other machinery -1.55 -(2.92) *** 0.9
other manufactures -1.54 -(4.72) *** 1.2
Obs: 106, 2(57;49);PR > 2: 91836.61, 0.00
Joint test that all negative coecients equal 2(18);PR > 2: 1113.46, 0.00
Joint test that all primary sector coecients equal 2(9);PR > 2: 61.50, 0.00
Iterated SUR based.
*:signicant at the .10 level, **: .05 level, ***: .01 level, one-tailed test.
20Table 4
Iterated joint (SUR) regressions for taris ln(1 + t) and industry weights
bj
a
LHS variable RHS variables coecient z   ratio
tari WEIGHT
bj
a 0.055 (2.96) ****
INT SHARE -0.095 -(2.04) ***
FOOD 0.130 (3.06) ****
R2 .4679 2(3;39);PR > 2: 406, 0.00
weight
bj
a EU SHARE -409.290 -(1.11)
INT SHARE -2.054 -(3.49) ****
FOOD 0.530 (1.73) **
UNSKL 0.674 (0.77)
BEL 107.995 (3.37) ***
DNK -54.612 -(1.53) *
FRA 158.951 (1.57) *
DEU 26.427 (0.27)
GBR 185.084 (1.97) **
GRC -8.353 -(0.74)
IRL -32.219 -(3.34) ****
ITA 130.452 (2.20) ***
LUX 15.784 (1.34)
NLD -51.403 -(1.33) *
PRT 52.427 (1.79) **
ESP -151.807 -(3.38) ****
R2 .6592 2(16;26);PR > 2: 81.13, 0.00
*:signicant at the .15 level, **: .10 level, ***: .05 level, ****:.01 level two-tailed test.
Table 5
Taris ln(1 + t)regressed on weights
bj
a and Grossman-Helpman variables
single equation Heckman Heckman
RHS variables OLS ML Probit
lnWEIGHT 1.299 1.135
(3.88) *** (3.72) ***
Sigma -0.885 -0.849
-(3.26) *** -(2.66) ***
Size -0.321 -0.253 0.577
-(3.19) *** -(2.36) *** (3.26) ***
INT SHARE -1.222 -1.624 -2.299





obs, OLS R2 : 34, 0.753
F(3;31);Pr > F : 0:00 26.36, 0.00
obs, censored obs 42,7
Wald 2(3), Pr > 2 81.49,0
OLS Estimates are based on robust regressions, t-ratios in parentheses
*:signicant at the .01 level, **: .05 level, ***: .01 level.
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